Skip to content
 
If you can read this, either the style sheet didn't load or you have an older browser that doesn't support style sheets. Try clearing your browser cache and refreshing the page.

(US Naval Institute)   Navy investigation finds crew's response to fire included "This is just some fog, right?", "Someone else probably reported this", and "What's the regulation on wearing firefighting gear over my uniform?"   (news.usni.org) divider line
    More: Facepalm, Firefighting, United States Navy, ship's crew, Fire hose, ship's maintenance availability, USS Bonhomme Richard, firefighting organizations, fire  
•       •       •

2267 clicks; posted to Main » on 20 Oct 2021 at 12:16 AM (6 weeks ago)   |   Favorite    |   share:  Share on Twitter share via Email Share on Facebook



35 Comments     (+0 »)
View Voting Results: Smartest and Funniest
 
2021-10-20 12:38:48 AM  
Any guesses as to how many heads will roll?
 
2021-10-20 12:50:54 AM  
Fark user imageView Full Size


Is that wall glowing hot?
 
2021-10-20 12:58:06 AM  

ukexpat: Any guesses as to how many heads will roll?


Many.

Typically the military is pretty indiscriminate when it comes to applying the thorny cock of accountability.
Unlike most companies, our political system, or the antics of white people in general.

This is just my nearly two decades of military service talking. I'm sure there are examples describing otherwise.
 
2021-10-20 1:18:42 AM  

ukexpat: Any guesses as to how many heads will roll?


They basically called out every officer on the vessel as being directly responsible for the destruction.  I think pretty much every one of them can kiss their careers goodbye, and several of them will probably kiss their freedom goodbye.

Especially that fire chief that told SDFD to fark off for not wanting to risk their lives for the ship.
 
2021-10-20 2:04:24 AM  
Operation Clusterf*ck.

Did they TRY to screw that up as badly as they possibly could? Because wow.
 
2021-10-20 2:05:37 AM  

omg bbq: ukexpat: Any guesses as to how many heads will roll?

Many.

Typically the military is pretty indiscriminate when it comes to applying the thorny cock of accountability.
Unlike most companies, our political system, or the antics of white people in general.

This is just my nearly two decades of military service talking. I'm sure there are examples describing otherwise.


Yeah, not only did they lose a billion dollar warship but they made the whole Navy look bad.  They're going to be coming down like Thor's hammer on a lot of heads.
 
2021-10-20 2:44:01 AM  

NEDM: ukexpat: Any guesses as to how many heads will roll?

They basically called out every officer on the vessel as being directly responsible for the destruction.  I think pretty much every one of them can kiss their careers goodbye, and several of them will probably kiss their freedom goodbye.

Especially that fire chief that told SDFD to fark off for not wanting to risk their lives for the ship.


They also included 6 admirals in the list of people who farked up


Thats when you know they were pissed about it
 
2021-10-20 2:57:43 AM  

omg bbq: ukexpat: Any guesses as to how many heads will roll?

Many.

Typically the military is pretty indiscriminate when it comes to applying the thorny cock of accountability.
Unlike most companies, our political system, or the antics of white people in general.

This is just my nearly two decades of military service talking. I'm sure there are examples describing otherwise.



You're so right, this IS all about race.
 
2021-10-20 3:11:04 AM  
I twice had the distinction of being called "the most military guy I know" by both my Division Officer and my Chief. After completion of Shipboard Duty Section Fire-Fighting Training (1995 - long ago & far-away, I Kno: shortly before Retirement) I had no doubt I could lead my Duty Section or my Department/Division in fighting a fire until the pros (the rated Firemen) arrived to assist or relieve us. I was at the Old Fart End of my Mustangry but I have always understood the Philosophy of Duty.

First & foremost, as a fourth generation career military man, the one thing I learned early on from Sir was: Don't let it be my fault. By this, I do not mean blame someone else, but rather do whatever it is I must do to ensure I do not myself fail. (Death is failure.) The first step is to learn all I can about whatever it is, identify where I am weakest, and overdone weaknesses. After that, whatever it is, is easy.

Dame Davis keeping me reapeatedly after school to master long division, reading "My Philadelphia Father" by Cordelia Drexel Biddle Duke Robertson & "Cheaper by the Dozen" by Ernestine Gilbreth Carey & Frank Bunker Gilbreth Jr  (once you get past the famy stories and concentrate on the lives & lessons of Anthony (AJ) Drexel Biddle and the marital team of Frank Bunker Gilbreth & Lillian Miller Gilbreth, you find amazing ways to live life not only better, but with confidence and bravery!), and putting their examples to practice, my life improved.

Every job I've ever had had taught me something to use later in another job. Every thing I've ever read has eventually been something to draw upon layer, no matter how mundane. For instance, my brief stint as an actor (agent, credits & everything!) taught me that, no matter the job, act the part. Be the best Lemon Packing Warehouse Security Guard that ever existed on Stage, Screen or Real Life, and I was. Once, to help a frend deliver flowers to his girlfriend, I was so convincing as a daisy delivered, I managed to get past the FBI in a large city to get the flowers to her at her desk and get her to sign for them on a receipt I'd ginned-up on my first desk-top circa 1987. I once had to learn a mm ethic of hunting submarines called "Target Motion Analysis," at which I early recognized I would suck like an asthmatic Hoover; however, I identified the parts at which I would suck most, acted like I knew WTF I was doing, and led my crew to a perfect score three times, the third when my CO paid a surprise visit. When he congratulated me, I thanked him & vowed to do better next time. Mine own motto had become: "Live & learn: Learn & Live!"
 
2021-10-20 6:14:19 AM  
As a career DC specialist/trainer (hull technician): WTF guys? Great damage control has been the USN standard since WW2, but you just had to mess it up.

Heck, one of the few positives from the collisions a few years ago was the damage response.
 
2021-10-20 6:20:53 AM  
FTFA:

"some sailors, including several chief petty officers, didn't don the required firefighting equipment. They mistakenly believed they couldn't do so while wearing the Type III Navy working uniform, rather than their coveralls."

In other words, there is a problem with how people are supposed to be properly dressed in an emergency situation and the belief that somehow, someone is probably going to be A15'ed for being out of uniform no matter what the situation. Why is it believed that decorum has become more important than the ability to immediately respond with action?

Oh, right.

Fark user imageView Full Size
Fark user imageView Full Size


When a Military organization has become more concerned with maintaining appearances than the ability to function. It seems to me that every Sailor should be ready for action, current mode of dress notwithstanding. Why is it that they wear one uniform for duty, and another for off-duty, and another for being out in public? Why is it that people believed they would get in trouble for wearing the wrong outfit when things go to hell?
 
2021-10-20 7:18:20 AM  
They didn't know they could wear firefighting equipment with the working uniform? That's some real surface Navy shiat right there.
Seaman Holder: holy shiat there's a fire!
Cheif Idiot: hold on there, shipmate, you're not in the correct uniform. Go change.

/yeah, it would be uncomfortable, but so is burning alive.
//meh, for my boat in shipyard the policy is "hit it with two fire extinguishers, if that doesn't put it out ensure everyone evacuates safely and stand by to guide the shipyard fire team to it."
///we have 0 firefighting equipment or systems installed right now.
 
2021-10-20 7:42:42 AM  

sunsetlamp: omg bbq: ukexpat: Any guesses as to how many heads will roll?

Many.

Typically the military is pretty indiscriminate when it comes to applying the thorny cock of accountability.
Unlike most companies, our political system, or the antics of white people in general.

This is just my nearly two decades of military service talking. I'm sure there are examples describing otherwise.


You're so right, this IS all about race.


It's not about politics or private businesses either, cookie. I was making comparisons. Sometimes humans do that when they are trying to highlight the similarities or differences between differentiating systems.
 
2021-10-20 8:16:41 AM  
So, they thought a refit was an extended vacation and got lax.

They were farking around, now they'll find out.
 
2021-10-20 8:37:04 AM  

omg bbq: ukexpat: Any guesses as to how many heads will roll?

Many.

Typically the military is pretty indiscriminate when it comes to applying the thorny cock of accountability.
Unlike most companies, our political system, or the antics of white people in general.

This is just my nearly two decades of military service talking. I'm sure there are examples describing otherwise.


This one feels different. I don't remember that many names named after the 2 collisions. SWRMC leadership is highly implicated...
 
2021-10-20 8:39:17 AM  

Deathfrogg: FTFA:

"some sailors, including several chief petty officers, didn't don the required firefighting equipment. They mistakenly believed they couldn't do so while wearing the Type III Navy working uniform, rather than their coveralls."

In other words, there is a problem with how people are supposed to be properly dressed in an emergency situation and the belief that somehow, someone is probably going to be A15'ed for being out of uniform no matter what the situation. Why is it believed that decorum has become more important than the ability to immediately respond with action?

Oh, right.

[Fark user image 267x189] [Fark user image 267x189]

When a Military organization has become more concerned with maintaining appearances than the ability to function. It seems to me that every Sailor should be ready for action, current mode of dress notwithstanding. Why is it that they wear one uniform for duty, and another for off-duty, and another for being out in public? Why is it that people believed they would get in trouble for wearing the wrong outfit when things go to hell?


What.

Farking what.

The Merchies have this shiat figured out.  A fire is a farking fire, you show up in whatever you're wearing.  If you're at a formal function, you show up in your dress uniform.  If you're in the middle of a shower, you show up buckass naked*.  If the ship's on fire, every farking second counts!   What the absolute FARK, Navy?!

/*yeah, I've actually seen that happen.  2/M was showering when the alarm went off.  Came running through the bridge dripping water, only wearing his boots.
 
2021-10-20 8:43:29 AM  
The Navy has a tradition of this:

The Mark 14 Torpedo - Failure is Like Onions
Youtube eQ5Ru7Zu_1I
 
2021-10-20 8:57:02 AM  

Mail Order American Husband: //meh, for my boat in shipyard the policy is "hit it with two fire extinguishers, if that doesn't put it out ensure everyone evacuates safely and stand by to guide the shipyard fire team to it."
///we have 0 firefighting equipment or systems installed right now.


If you are alone change that policy. First thing you do is raise the alarm.

If you are with someone, you can send them to raise the alarm and then attack the fire, but a ton of harm that shouldn't have occurred did because one guy thought "it's a small fire and I have an extinguisher."

Raise the alarm. Always. Doubly so in a shipyard where the normal fire security is shot to hell.
 
2021-10-20 8:58:33 AM  

studebaker hoch: [Fark user image 850x469]

Is that wall glowing hot?


It might be. Might be scattered light in the smoke, but the walls are steel, get them hot enough and they'll glow.

Oh, the whole space will be filled with toxic gas from the paint, so the right answer if you don't have SCBA is get on the floor and GTFO.
 
2021-10-20 8:59:13 AM  
I'm just floored by so many of the findings. The fact that there was such garbage communication early on, people didn't know how to decouple QDs, and NOT WEARING FIREFIGHTING GEAR BECAUSE YOU THINK YOU'RE IN THE WRONG UNIFORM. And that last one was at least some number of chefs, which reinforces my already rock-bottom opinion of goats. Useless as tits on a bull.

I didn't enjoy my time in the navy, or the shipyard, but the whole thing turns my stomach that they pissed their ship away.
 
2021-10-20 9:03:10 AM  

sleze: omg bbq: ukexpat: Any guesses as to how many heads will roll?

Many.

Typically the military is pretty indiscriminate when it comes to applying the thorny cock of accountability.
Unlike most companies, our political system, or the antics of white people in general.

This is just my nearly two decades of military service talking. I'm sure there are examples describing otherwise.

This one feels different. I don't remember that many names named after the 2 collisions. SWRMC leadership is highly implicated...


Based off of the one diagram in the article I'm guessing improperly stowed flammables and compressed gasses. Looks like there were oxygen and propane cylinders stored in the same compartment as wood and cardboard.

Plus in all the photos I've seen there weren't any quick disconnects by hatches/doors.

Been a while but IIRC you were supposed to bring cutting gases back to SIMA or at least down to racks on the pier at the end of the day.
 
2021-10-20 9:25:50 AM  

Marshal Tito: I'm just floored by so many of the findings. The fact that there was such garbage communication early on, people didn't know how to decouple QDs, and NOT WEARING FIREFIGHTING GEAR BECAUSE YOU THINK YOU'RE IN THE WRONG UNIFORM. And that last one was at least some number of chefs, which reinforces my already rock-bottom opinion of goats. Useless as tits on a bull.

I didn't enjoy my time in the navy, or the shipyard, but the whole thing turns my stomach that they pissed their ship away.


The sailor who saw the "fog or mist" in the ship as she was racking in and either didn't report it or didn't give it the urgency it needed needs to be taken out to sea and kicked off the deck. I never served a minute in the military, but that's the kind of bullshiat I used to beat my officers' heads in over when I was in security.

If you see something that JDLR, for the love of god, say something, don't just go off duty and leave it for the next guy!
 
2021-10-20 9:32:24 AM  
Also interesting that the article does not mention the emergency firemain situation.
 
2021-10-20 10:53:37 AM  

Deathfrogg: When a Military organization has become more concerned with maintaining appearances than the ability to function. It seems to me that every Sailor should be ready for action, current mode of dress notwithstanding. Why is it that they wear one uniform for duty, and another for off-duty, and another for being out in public? Why is it that people believed they would get in trouble for wearing the wrong outfit when things go to hell?


No action-ready unit has ever passed inspection.
No inspection-ready unit has ever passed action.
 
2021-10-20 10:55:12 AM  

iToad: The Navy has a tradition of this:

[Youtube-video https://www.youtube.com/embed/eQ5Ru7Zu​_1I]


Nonsense.  Nobody cries when you chop up a mk.14
 
2021-10-20 11:17:52 AM  
More details here

Shipyard time sucks and responses are hampered by obstructions, limited personnel (lots of sailors off ship for training and lower manning priority), etc.,  but the link above lays out some pretty specific and egregious examples of negligence

From my link:
"An example of how these focus areas combined to result in unacceptable levels of risk is the status of the ship's Aqueous Film Forming Foam sprinkling system," the report states. "At no point in the firefighting effort was it used - in part because maintenance was not properly performed to keep it ready and in part because the crew lacked familiarity with capability and availability."

From my experience, these types of investigations will always turn up procedural mistakes and/or oversights.  Even having spent a career doing this and having been involved as a member of a safety investigation this is pretty bad.
 
2021-10-20 11:27:01 AM  
I liked reading the little side-scrolling list where they detailed each person's responsibilities and how they farked it up.  A couple of people got mitigating statements, most of which were pretty farking weaksauce.

This is the only dude I maybe feel sorry for:

Fark user imageView Full Size
 
2021-10-20 11:32:31 AM  

ukexpat: Any guesses as to how many heads will roll?


I'm so glad I'm not in right now. You realize how much training everyone is going to have to have???

/there's a fire!
//let's go...get it!!
 
2021-10-20 11:46:59 AM  
Great link/article subby, thank you
 
2021-10-20 11:47:09 AM  

Combustion: ukexpat: Any guesses as to how many heads will roll?

I'm so glad I'm not in right now. You realize how much training everyone is going to have to have???

/there's a fire!
//let's go...get it!!


User name checked out.

IRT training I remember after the USS Cole got bombed every other drill was a mine hit.

The lesson learned message for BHR is going to be EPIC though...
 
2021-10-20 12:29:29 PM  
Ugh!

West Coast Navy COs seem to have completely ignored several major policy changes since Miami burned up.

- Every availability lasting more than 30 days requires a fire drill which includes the local shore FD and specifically includes chains of command and communication.
BHR command? Nah. We're good.

- 187 shipboard fire stations (out of 216) were deactivated or unequipped with hoses or had broken nozzles. In the event shipboard fire stations are rendered unusable/unavailable during an avail. shore fire pumps must be established and satellite pumping stations (capable of at least 100 gallons/minute) must be established at strategic locations, with sufficient hose length to reach every compartment.
BHR command? Too much hassle. We're good.

- Repair lockers (sources for fire-fighting gear and muster/control points for all damage control in different sections of the ship) must be maintained in fully-operational condition at all times. Period. Full stop. Any availability activity which renders a repair locker unusable mandates setting up the same capability in a nearby location.
BHR command? Repair lockers? Are those important?

- Fire drills. Every farking day. In or out of port. In or out of availability. No farking exceptions. If the duty sections had been conducting fire drills, they wouldn't have been so uncoordinated, and DC Central wouldn't have been so clueless.
BHR command? Too much bother. Interrupts the work. Ain't nothin' gonna happen.

- Fire boundaries. During availabilities, many doors/hatches/scuttles/etc may be rendered inoperative due to temporary services being run through the openings, or by structural work. Fire bulkheads must be specifically identified and marked, and ANYTHING running through those bulkheads must have a quick-disconnect with six feet. Period. Full stop.
BHR command? Slows down the work. We're good.

- Roving patrols. At least one of the duty personnel is required to be conducting a roving patrol through every compartment and space at least once per hour. For Engineering watchstanders, this is usually the Sounding and Security watch (frequently referred to as "Secret Squirrel"), who covers every space below the main deck of the ship. I have stood this watch- inport and underway- on a ship the size and configuration of BHR. There's no excuse for missing smoke coming out of Lower V into Upper V, because the watchstander has to transit Upper V several times during a given patrol round.
BHR command? It's an avail. What could possibly go wrong? Give the guys a break.


fark the entire BHR chain of command for allowing their shiat to get so farked up. Screw the loss of a 3-billion dollar warship- they put every sailor and civilian yard worker in mortal peril for the sake of getting through the avail on time. fark them all- individually and collectively.
 
2021-10-20 12:42:56 PM  

Wenchmaster: - Every availability lasting more than 30 days requires a fire drill which includes the local shore FD and specifically includes chains of command and communication.
BHR command? Nah. We're good.

- 187 shipboard fire stations (out of 216) were deactivated or unequipped with hoses or had broken nozzles. In the event shipboard fire stations are rendered unusable/unavailable during an avail. shore fire pumps must be established and satellite pumping stations (capable of at least 100 gallons/minute) must be established at strategic locations, with sufficient hose length to reach every compartment.
BHR command? Too much hassle. We're good.


Hey now, don't forget the federal fire chief onscene telling San Diego FD to fark off for not wanting to reenter a burning empty ship!
 
2021-10-20 12:47:02 PM  
Heck, BHR couldn't be bothered to drain and inert the JP-5 (aircraft fuel) systems (source of secondary explosion) during a shipyard availability. Total clown show.
 
2021-10-20 2:15:04 PM  

Gleeman: Heck, BHR couldn't be bothered to drain and inert the JP-5 (aircraft fuel) systems (source of secondary explosion) during a shipyard availability. Total clown show.


FTFA:

Just three months before the fire, Bonhomme Richard had been ordered to get its shipboard firefighting systems up to scratch when it onloaded nearly 1 million gallons of fuel, according to the report, but only "a limited" portion of the sprinkling systems were brought back online.

Why is it that being on Avail status in port for a major refit, that fuel was loaded in the middle of the refit process? It seems to me, that loading fuel is something that would be done after the refit process was completed. It didn't need to have the fuel onboard at all. Hell, NASA didn't load the main fuel tank on the shuttle until the last few days before launch for this exact reason. After everything else is checked, inspected and certified as ready.

Another question: Why does it seem apparent that local firefighting resources are kept in the equation as a major part of Naval emergency services. Does the USN shipyard operations share any of their budget with the local guys in case of this contingency?

3: Do they ever even train together at all?

Somebody took a lot of shiat for granted, and if there is one thing I do know about complex operations like a major refit of a large ship, anything can happen, and Murphy rules the world.
 
2021-10-20 3:54:03 PM  

Herbie555: I liked reading the little side-scrolling list where they detailed each person's responsibilities and how they farked it up.  A couple of people got mitigating statements, most of which were pretty farking weaksauce.

This is the only dude I maybe feel sorry for:

[Fark user image 267x1149]



Hell of a first watch as CDO.

The wholesale failure of BHR's entire chain of command is in TFA. Start firing them (into the sun). Start with the Admiral at PacFleet and the PhibGru Admiral, then work all the way down the decision-making chain of command to the CO. Their crew was untrained and inexperienced, which is directly the fault of the CO and the officers under his command. None of the CO's superiors knew about the widespread stupiditynesses on BHR, which means they didn't have subordinates conducting oversight inspections (required by OPNAV instructions) or weren't paying attention to the reports from the inspections.

Let's toss in a bunch of people from Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA) command. Ships in availability are supposed to be overseen by a designated Navy Supervisory Authority (NSA), usually the Regional Maintenance Center (RMC) or Navy Shipyard. NSAs are required to have Fire Safety Officers (FSOs) visiting every ship in availability daily to find and report unsafe conditions like those documented in TFA. None of those people (if any were actually assigned) seem to have noticed the fire bulkhead obstructions or out-of-commission fire stations. The senior personnel at the NSA and the NAVSEA employees at San Diego need to lose their jobs.

Those Chief Petty Officers on BHR who were concerned about their uniform during a mass casualty should never have been aboard during an avail in anything other than coveralls or cotton uniforms and safety shoes/boots. The polyester uniforms are easier to wear and keep neat, and the permanently-polished coroframs look snazzy, but they've got a distressing tendency to melt and/or burn when exposed to fire, and should only be worn at shore facilities (if at all).

TFA said the CO and XO were on scene less than an hour after the fire was reported, but NO ONE took command of coordinating the fire-fighting efforts until an officer not actually assigned to BHR took control and improvised a command center. Note a command center is required by the 8010 instruction, but no one at PacFleet or NAVSEA seemed to have cared enough to notice BHR and the NSA didn't have one and didn't know how to run it if they did.

PacFleet gets a lot of blame for this because BHR's CO was trying to follow PacFleet's priority list:
- Get ship repaired and back in service on schedule
- Make sure all your paperwork is correctly filed on time
- Don't make your boss look bad

The appropriate priority list the chain of command should have been pushing:
- Don't let anyone get killed
- Don't let anyone get hurt
- Don't allow any mission-compromising damage to the ship
- Get the repairs done properly
- Preferably get the repairs done on time

Safety. Accuracy. Speed. In that farking order. I went through multiple maintenance availabilities and a couple of shipyard overhauls on different ships when I was wearing the blue suit. Any time the senior officers are more interested in getting a pat on the back from their superiors than in getting the job done right, the result is a disaster. The disaster can be mitigated by competent senior enlisted personnel (mainly Chiefs and Leading Petty Officers), but there's still going to be a disaster.

Getting a "Bravo Zulu" (Navy slang for "attaboy") from your boss does not justify putting people's lives and health at risk. From published reports, it seems PacFleet is stuffed full of officers whose only concerns are following the "right" career path and sucking up to the "right" senior officers. The CO aboard my last ship was the exact opposite of the PacFleet officers I've encountered or read about. All CDR Kiley cared about was making sure his ship and crew were ready to fight at any moment, and screw the career path. Because of his priorities, he was able to get his destroyer fired up, underway, and at General Quarters less than an hour after the first plane hit on 9-11-01- undermanned, but locked and loaded and ready for war. He kept that ship on station until relieved two days later. He never made O-6 (Captain), and retired. That's the type of officer we need.
 
Displayed 35 of 35 comments

View Voting Results: Smartest and Funniest

This thread is closed to new comments.

Continue Farking




On Twitter


  1. Links are submitted by members of the Fark community.

  2. When community members submit a link, they also write a custom headline for the story.

  3. Other Farkers comment on the links. This is the number of comments. Click here to read them.

  4. Click here to submit a link.